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More than gold and oil, railroad and free-
way construction, the film and aerospace
industries, water distribution has shaped the
development of California’s cities and country-
side. Nowhere is the vital significance of water
more obvious than in Los Angeles, which
today imports more than eighty percent of its
water supply from sources lying hundreds of
miles beyond its legal boundaries. Los
Angeles grew in the nineteenth century despite
its lack of sewers and schools, a coastal city
without a port, its growth fed by booster adver-
tising and its development founded on
prospects for the future rather than on actual
demand. By the turn of the century, however,
the rigid limits of the city’s indigenous water
supply had already begun to circumscribe the
business community’s prospects for continued
growth and expansion. And so, with money,
guns, and a unity of purpose with what they
identified as the public interest, the bankers
and businessmen of Los Angeles determined
to seize the water resources of the Owens
Valley 240 miles to the northeast. And, by cor-
recting God’s design for their community with
the construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct,
they laid the foundations for the modem
metropolis.
Depending upon the popular proclivities
of the times, the complex and dramatic story of
Los Angeles, the Owens Valley, and the build-
ing of the aqueduct has been used variously as
a demonstration of the evils of municipal own-
ership of utilities, as an example of the nasti-
ness of Los Angeles in general and of the Los
Angeles Times in particular, and, most recently in
the widely successful film Chinatown, as a set-
ting for an examination of the multiple levels
of human corruption.1 Certainly, the story is
rich in the interplay of personality and event,
for it boasts a cast of characters ranging from
Teddy Roosevelt to the KKK and includes
moments of triumph, bitter betrayal, armed
conflict, and numerous harrowing escapes
















Owens Valley and the Los
Angeles Aqueduct, 
1900 - 1927
By William L. Kahrl
 Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in
two pieces in the 1976 Spring and Summer issues of the
California Historical Quarterly.  West-Northwest is republishing
this article in two parts with endnotes to maintain the integrity
of the original work
events, however, has been shaped largely by a
controversy over questions of municipal cor-
ruption. In addition, primary research materi-
als, such as the letters and personal memoirs of
the principal actors, are lacking, with the result
that formal histories of these events have tend-
ed to side either with Los Angeles or the Owens
Valley, arguing their cases on one another’s
authority.2
This study, however, focuses upon the poli-
tics of the controversy, including the way in
which the aqueduct was promoted to the Los
Angeles electorate, and, in the second article of
this series, the governmental response to the
conflict which ensued. From this perspective,
the problem of corruption is transformed to
reveal a conflict not between the public and pri-
vate sectors but between competing public
interests.
The initial problem which Los Angeles con-
fronted in its determination to develop a new
source of water was that at the end of the nine-
teenth century the city did not even have con-
trol of its existing water resources. Until the
twentieth century, water development in
California was almost exclusively an activity of
private enterprise.3 Private water companies
proliferated wherever the rights to an existing
streamflow could be secured and the water sold
to nearby towns. Confidence in the free enter-
prise system ran particularly strong in nine-
teenth-century Los Angeles where private com-
panies provided the full range of utility services
upon which the community depended—gas,
electricity, communications, and all forms of
public transportation. In 1868, the city granted
a thirty-year lease on its water supply to the Los
Angeles Water Company. In exchange the com-
pany developed a distribution system which it
operated at considerable profit to itself. Public
dissatisfaction with rates and the quality of
service, however, increased as the term of the
lease drew near.4
Amendments to the city charter in 1889
affirmed the city’s authority to operate its own
water system, and the Republican party plat-
form of 1896 called for municipal ownership on
the promise that the city could provide water at
ten per cent of the company’s charges.5 The
chairman of the Republican City Central
Committee that year was the former superin-
tendent of the private water company, Fred
Eaton, a native Angeleno and son of a
forty-niner who had helped found Pasadena. In
1898, Eaton was elected mayor on a municipal
ownership platform from which he attacked his
former employer for the fire hazards presented
by the company’s reliance on small diameter
water mains.
After the expiration of the lease in 1898,
Los Angeles had to fight in the courts for four
years to force the company to withdraw, and the
city ultimately paid $2 million to buy back its
own water system. Bonds for this purchase
were approved in August, 1901, and the city
assumed control the following February
through a seven-member elective Board of
Water Commissioners. Progress on the devel-
opment of the system was delayed another
year, however, until, in the elections of
February, 1903, the city charter was amended
again to prohibit the granting of another lease
and to insulate the Board of Water
Commissioners from politics by requiring that
all positions on the board be appointed by the
mayor subject to confirmation by the city coun-
cil.6
Initially, the move for municipal ownership
of the city water system was presented simply
as a means of securing more efficient service at
lower rates. The unspoken related issue of
urban expansion, however, possessed a far
greater importance for the city’s future. In 1868,
the city had leased its water rights to private
enterprise because the development of an effi-
cient distribution system was believed to be
too great a burden for the city treasury to bear.
By 1900, the situation had reversed. The costs
involved in securing and transporting a new
source of water to Los Angeles lay beyond the
reach of private capital. The availability of the
far greater resources of municipal finance was a
necessary first step toward the construction of
a new water project.
Henry Huntington, masterbuilder and first
among financial giants in the Los Angeles busi-
ness community, had already recognized these
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efforts to fund construction of a harbor at San
Pedro forced him to turn to the federal govern-
ment for assistance. Once the city had organ-
ized itself to operate its own water system,
Huntington in 1904 lent his support to a water
development scheme which Fred Eaton had
been attempting to promote ever since he
resigned from the Los Angeles Water Company
in 1886. Although grand designs abounded in
the early 1900s for bringing water to the
expanding cities of Southern California, Eaton
enjoyed a special advantage in advocating his
own plan for Los Angeles because of his expe-
rience in the field, his prominence in the com-
munity as a former mayor, his leadership in the
battle over municipal ownership, and his close
personal relationship with the superintendent
of the new municipal water system, William
Mulholland.
Mulholland in turn owed much of his suc-
cess to Eaton’s friendship. A former merchant
seaman and itinerant knife-sharpener,
Mulholland had taken a job digging ditches for
the water company upon his arrival in Los
Angeles in 1878. Although he lacked any formal
training as an engineer, Mulholland rose so
rapidly through the ranks of Eaton’s staff that
when Eaton left the company eight years later
to seek public office, Mulholland took over as
his successor, a position he retained through
the transfer to municipal ownership.7 Thus it
was to a protégé that Eaton took his plan, and
Mulholland, in September, 1904, readily agreed
to accompany his mentor on a buckboard jour-
ney to the Owens Valley, a slender, ten-
by-one-hundred-mile depression between the
Sierra Nevada on the west and the White
Mountains and Inyo Range on the east in Inyo
and Mono counties. There, Eaton claimed, lay
a water supply capable of supporting a city ten
times the current size of Los Angeles.
The agricultural communities of the Owens
Valley at this time were just emerging from the
frontier landscape of chaparral, cactus, and
sagebrush.8 More than 60,000 acres were
already tinder irrigation, and the area’s agricul-
tural products of hard grains, apples, corn, and
honey were among the finest displayed each
year at the state fair.9 With the opening of min-
ing camps in southeastern Nevada, the Owens
Valley looked forward to the prospect of
expanding prosperity as one of the prime agri-
cultural and mining regions of the state.
Los Angeles was not the only public entity
to recognize the potential of the valley for
water development. Fully a year before
Mulholland’s first visit, the federal govern-
ment’s newly created National Reclamation
Service had entered the valley eager to estab-
lish a demonstration model of systematic irri-
gation. The Reclamation Service’s plans called
for doubling the total irrigated acreage within
the valley, and by the time of Mulholland’s
visit, the local farmers had already signed over
their water storage rights for the new project
and agreed to the removal of more than
500,000 acres of the valley from entry for set-
tlement under the Homestead Act.10
Mulholland’s initial problem, then, was
one of convincing the federal government to
withdraw its interest in favor of the interests of
Los Angeles. Fortunately, the Chief of
Southwest Operations for the Reclamation
Service, J. B. Lippincott, was himself a resident
of Los Angeles and a leader with Eaton in the
campaign for the successful bond issue with
which the city bought back its water supply. On
September 17, 1904, Lippincott advised the
Department of Interior of Los Angeles’ interest
in the Owens Valley, and in a meeting with city
representatives in November, Lippincott
recommended to his immediate superior, F. H.
Newell, Chief Engineer for the Reclamation
Service, that Los Angeles be provided with all
of the maps and technical studies the service
had prepared on the valley. In February, 1905,
Lippincott and Newell worked out a plan for
Los Angeles to reimburse the service for its
work, and Lippincott privately arranged to pro-
vide Mulholland with a detailed report on the
available water supply in Southern California.
Thus, in the months which followed—and
unbeknownst to the Owens Valley ranchers—
the efforts of the federal engineers gradually
shifted from the development of an irrigation
project for agricultural development of the
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Eaton himself presented Mulholland with a
more delicate problem, for Eaton’s earlier advo-
cacy of municipal ownership of the city water
system had been tied to his own scheme for pri-
vate exploitation of the Owens Valley water.
Realizing that the Los Angeles Water Company
lacked both the means and the desire to under-
take a project requiring capital of such magni-
tude, he had joined Huntington and other mem-
bers of the business community in recognizing
municipalization as a necessary first step
toward the development of a new water source
for the city. Municipalization in Eaton’s view,
however, served only to open a source of capital
for the construction of the mammoth project
and to guarantee a market for the private enter-
prise Eaton had been promoting for years.
Eaton intended that the water itself should
remain in private hands and be made available
to Los Angeles in an initial lot of 15,000 miner’s
inches at an annual rate of $100 an inch.12 And,
while Mulholland returned to the city to meet
with the members of the water board after his
first visit to the valley in September 1904, Eaton
raced East to consult with Dillon and Hubbard,
bond attorneys in New York, in yet another fruit-
less attempt to form a private consortium for
the purchase of water rights in the Owens
Valley.13
Mulholland, however, believed in a more
radical view of public ownership of water, and he
regarded as folly an arrangement which would
render the city’s water supply and the opera-
tions of his agency captive to the interests of
private owners and the rates they might
demand. Accordingly, he skillfully maneuvered
to use the Reclamation Service to resolve this
conflict with Eaton. Rather than pressing his
case with Eaton directly, Mulholland deployed
Lippincott of the Reclamation Service to con-
front Eaton with the essential condition that the
Reclamation Service would not withdraw its
interest in the Owens Valley unless the Los
Angeles project were “public owned from one
end to the other.”14 In return Mulholland sweet-
ened the bitterness of defeat for his old friend
and mentor with a very favorable deal on the key
property in Long Valley at the headwaters of the
Owens River on which Eaton held an option.
Under the terms of this agreement, final-
ized in May, 1905, Los Angeles agreed to pay
Eaton $450,000 for the water rights and an
easement allowing the eventual construction
of a small reservoir on the 12,000-acre ranch
Eaton had purchased for $500,000. If Los
Angeles failed to exercise its option by the end
of that year, the price would go up to $475,000,
and if for any reason the project were not built,
all the land would revert to Eaton. Eaton
retained control of the rest of the property,
more than 10,000 acres, together with 5000
head of cattle valued at $7-10 a head. Eaton
would thus be paid the entire purchase price of
the property at Long Valley, 90-95 per cent in
cash and the balance in livestock, while still
retaining control of more than eighty percent
of the land. In addition, it was recognized that
as the ranchers downstream were forced out of
business by the project, they would have no
choice but to sell their cattle at reduced prices
to Eaton who would be the sole surviving
rancher in the valley. 15
For the time being, Eaton seemed to be as
happy dreaming about an eventual cattle
empire as he had been about a possible water
empire, and he promptly set about acquiring
options on the downstream water rights for
transfer to the city of Los Angeles, as he and
Mulholland had agreed. Using the Reclamation
Service maps provided by Lippincott and out-
fitting himself with credentials which appeared
to identify him as an agent of the federal gov-
ernment, Eaton encountered little resistance
from the unsuspecting farmers who thought
they were aiding reclamation for the valley
rather than giving up their water to Los
Angeles.16
All of these negotiations, purchases, and
plans were carried out in strictest secrecy due
to the fears of Los Angeles officials that pub-
licity about the project would escalate prices
on the properties they needed. Accordingly, a
pledge was secured from all the Los Angeles
newspapers that no mention would be made of
the city water board’s activities in relation to
the Owens Valley. Nevertheless, Eaton’s mas-
sive purchases and transfers of title to the city
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office, and embarrassing questions began to
be raised about the real intentions of the
Reclamation Service and its putative agent,
Fred Eaton.
Faced with the threat of disclosure, the
service headquarters staff in Washington, D.C.,
resolved: “We cannot clear the skirts of the
Reclamation Service too quickly or complete-
ly.”17 They decided, therefore, to call a panel of
engineers to meet on neutral ground in San
Francisco to review the Reclamation Service’s
plans and then to issue a report announcing
that the proposed federal project was not as
attractive as it had first seemed and, by default,
that the aqueduct was a more worthy endeav-
or.
At the hearing in July, 1905, Lippincott of
the Reclamation Service testified that the
claims of Los Angeles to the Owens River water
were superior to those of the reclamation proj-
ect, and he recommended that the service
therefore should do all it could to aid the city.18
This graceful transfer was fouled, however, by
the appearance at the hearing of J. C. Clausen,
the Reclamation Service engineer who design-
ed the Owens Valley project. Clausen had been
sent to Yuma during the period that the service
was trying to plan a way to bow out of the val-
ley, but he was not a man to play anyone’s fool.
When the hearing was called, he returned to
testify about the Valley’s assets for his irriga-
tion project: abundant water power, fertile soil,
genial climate, and the availability of agri-
cultural markets in nearby Tonopah and
Goldfield. Moreover, he demonstrated, it was
economical. The Reclamation Service had
twenty-eight projects on its drawing boards at
that time, some ranging as high in cost as $86
an acre. The Owens Valley project was budget-
ed at $21.58 an acre as compared with an aver-
age price for all twenty-eight of $30.97 an
acre.19
Clausen’s embarrassing testimony encour-
aged the review panel to issue a report favoring
the federal government’s project “unless the
men who had bought key property for Los
Angeles had made it impractical.”20 This report
was not released, however, until July 28, 1905,
the very day that Mulholland and Eaton con-
cluded the final series of purchases which did,
in fact, render the federal project impractical.
With the appearance of this all-important
caveat in the Reclamation Service’s published
report, the Los Angeles Times next morning
breached the voluntary wall of silence which
had hitherto surrounded the project with its
own massive report on the city’s plans to bring
the Owens River to a vast reservoir in the San
Fernando Valley. In characteristic exalted
prose, it proclaimed: “The cable that has held
the San Fernando Valley vassal for ten cen-
turies to the arid demon is about to be severed
by the magic scimitar of modern engineering
skill.”21
The Times’ sudden revelation, however, had
unfortunate consequences for a number of the
aqueduct’s principal supporters which were
entirely unintended by the publisher of the
Times, Harrison Gray Otis. The appearance of
the Times’ report that morning left Fred Eaton
unprepared and trapped amidst an angry
crowd of Owens Valley ranchers whom he just
barely succeeded in staring down. An investi-
gation of Lippincott’s role in the affair began
immediately and produced the not very sur-
prising discovery that he had been drawing a
salary from the city of Los Angeles while simul-
taneously working for the federal government.
Lippincott’s prospects of continued employ-
ment with the Reclamation Service were not
improved by the fact that the Times, in its first
report on the project, injudiciously commend-
ed him for his “valuable assistance” in “looking
after” Fred Eaton’s purchases and for his help
in arranging an initial survey of the route for
the aqueduct by federal engineers. The Times
concluded, “Without Mr. Lippincott’s interest
and cooperation, it is declared that the plan
never would have gone through. . . . Any other
government engineer, a non-resident of Los
Angeles and not familiar with the needs of this
section, undoubtedly would have gone ahead
with nothing more than the mere reclamation
of arid lands in view.”22 Damned by such avid
praise, Lippincott was forced to resign the fol-
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Newell similarly suffered from special com-
mendation by the water board when on June 5,
1905, it passed an official resolution thanking
him for his “valuable assistance.” The resolu-
tion was promptly withdrawn when its poten-
tial effect upon Newell’s career was realized,
and Newell managed to remain on the federal
payroll until a House investigation of his con-
flicting activities forced his suspension in
1913.23 Clausen, meanwhile, resigned from the
Reclamation Service and worked intermittently
thereafter as a consulting engineer for the
Owens Valley ranchers.
More important for the long-term
prospects of the Los Angeles project, by break-
ing the gentleman’s agreement among the
other editors and scooping every other paper
in town, Otis stirred the wrath of William
Randolph Hearst, who, in 1903, had estab-
lished the Los Angeles Examiner, the seventh in
his expanding empire. The older newspapers in
town, Otis’ Times most prominently among
them, shared the booster gospel of the busi-
ness community; in the 1870’s, for example,
they had turned their pages into publicity
broadsides for the first great land boom and
distributed them in the hotels and business
establishments of the East.24 Hearst’s press,
however, was of the muck-racking persuasion,
and while the other papers rallied in uniform
praise of the proposed aqueduct, the Examiner’s
reports on the issue started out with suspicion
and rapidly deteriorated into hostility.
The Examiner’s initial line of inquiry focused
sharply on the awesome haste with which the
water board and city council were proceeding
to get the project underway. On August 14,
1905, barely two weeks after the citizens of Los
Angeles had learned for the first time of the
planned aqueduct, the city council called for a
$1.5 million bond election to pay the costs of
preliminary surveys and acquisition; the elec-
tion was to be held three weeks later on
September 7. The people were thus being
asked to give initial approval to a project which
was expected to cost $23 million before they
had even seen a map of the proposed aque-
duct.25
Meeting the attack, Mulholland attempted
at first to drown all questions in a flood of sta-
tistics which, as they proliferated, became
increasingly contradictory. The Examiner leapt
on the inconsistencies, pointing out that
Mulholland could not even give a definite fig-
ure for the amount of water that Los Angeles
would receive from the project. Mulholland, in
turn, produced the voluminous reports pre-
pared by the Reclamation Service to demon-
strate that technical studies of the Owens River
had been made, at least by someone.26
Mulholland’s other efforts to explain his
inordinate haste met with no better reception
on the editorial pages of the Examiner. When
Mulholland, for example, warned that private
investors would take over the development of
the aqueduct if the city failed to act promptly,
the Examiner pointed out that Eaton had been
trying for years to interest a private investor in
the project without success and that the feder-
al government’s interest in the valley would
prohibit a private takeover at this point.
Similarly, when Mulholland maintained that
the bond issue had to be passed to meet the
first $50,000 installment, due October 1 on
Eaton’s property at Long Valley, the Examiner
argued that committing $1.5 million in public
funds for the sake of $50,000 was patently
absurd.27
Mulholland ultimately resorted to exagger-
ations of the city’s need for water as a way of
encouraging voters to approve his bonds, and,
in the weeks before the election, the Times
began to print almost daily predictions of the
dire consequences which would be visited on
Los Angeles if the aqueduct were not built.
One of the most persistent stories apparently
fabricated as a part of this scare campaign
involved the so-called drought which descend-
ed on Southern California at a time variously
cited as 1892 or 1895 and which reportedly per-
sisted until 1904. Modern historians still refer
to this drought, although it seems to have orig-
inated with Mulholland in the election of 1905.
For example, Erwin Cooper’s Aqueduct Empire
recalls on Mulholland’s authority that the aver-
age rainfall in Los Angeles from 1895 to 1904
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national weather bureau records reveal that Los
Angeles’ annual precipitation in this period aver-
aged 11.52 inches.29 Similarly, Remi Nadeau in
his history of the Los Angeles Aqueduct reports
that Mulholland first traveled to the Owens
Valley in September, 1904, because that sum-
mer’s “water famine” had set the city “reeling.”30
In fact, Los Angeles in 1904 received a perfectly
average rainfall of 11.88 inches, and in August,
the city experienced a record downpour for that
month which was not even approached in the
entire forty-year period from 1891 to 1930.31
Los Angeles did experience two successive
years of rainfall below nine inches in 1898 and
1899, but over the next four years the levels of
precipitation steadily increased, and in 1905,
rainfall totalled 19.19 inches. In the sixteen years
from 1890 to 1905, rainfall in Los Angeles aver-
aged 13.00 inches a year, an amount not appre-
ciably less than the 13.69-inch average annual
rainfall in the corresponding, contemporary peri-
od from 1958 to 1973.32 Alternatively, in the
twenty-four-year period from 1890 to 1913, the
year the aqueduct was completed, the average
annual rainfall in Los Angeles of 13.84 inches
actually exceeded the 13.46-inch average for the
corresponding period from 1950 to 1973.
Alternatively, in the twenty-four-year period from
1890 to 1913, the year the aqueduct was com-
pleted, the average annual rainfall in Los
Angeles of 13.84 inches actually exceeded the
13.46-inch average for the corresponding period
from 1950 to 1973.
Nevertheless, Mulholland declared that the
shortage existed, imposed strict measures to
prevent waste by the citizenry, and predicted that
the city’s existing water supply could not support
more than its present population of 200,000.33
The reliability of this claim can be assessed by
observing that before the aqueduct was com-
pleted, the population of the area more than
tripled without the city experiencing a water
shortage of any kind. To suggest that
Mulholland’s figures were calculated from whole
cloth is not to say that Los Angeles’ need for
water was not real but rather that it was a need
conditioned almost entirely upon the business
community’s prospect of massive growth and
expansion in the years ahead.
The Examiner, meanwhile, continued dig-
ging for a more creditable reason behind the
city’s rush to judgment at the polls. Although
the Examiner had long supported the idea of
water project for Los Angeles, they had main-
tained from the outset, “There must be no pol-
itics and no graft.”34 Their first question for
Mulholland when he announced the project
was whether the possibility existed for graft.
“None at all,” Mulholland answered. “The only
man who could graft is Fred Eaton, and I know
that he never made a dirty dollar in his life and
never will.”35 When the resolution to call an
election sailed through the city council on
August 14, the only dissenting councilman, A.
D. Houghton, himself the product of the polit-
ical reform movement led by J. R. Haynes and J.
B. Irvine, observed ominously, “It almost looks
as if some of these men [the other council
members] whose character and integrity are
above reproach, had been let in on this deal
three or four months ago, had purchased arid
lands, and are in haste to have them made
valuable by this water project.”36 The Examiner
picked up the insinuation of corruption and
played it coyly on the editorial page, observing
of the city council, “They are all men who, like
Jim Fisk’s legislators, ‘do not stir around for
nothing.’… They are the same men who obey
the behests of the trolley and gas monopolies.
How far is the water project allied with the
interests which control their actions?”37
. . . . 
Significantly, on August 22, the San
Francisco Chronicle ran an editorial which pointed
to the value of the proposed aqueduct to Los
Angeles commerce and noted the recurrence of
rumors in Bradstreet’s Financial Report to the effect
that the project was linked to a land develop-
ment scheme for the San Fernando Valley. The
Examiner waited two days to allow the Times’
Otis to prepare his response; then, on the
same day that the Times attacked the Chronicle in
an editorial entitled “Baseless Rumors,” the
Examiner struck with the revelation of an organ-
ized land syndicate which had purchased
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an acre, an investment which would return
millions once water arrived from the Owens
Valley. The Examiner named ten syndicate
members, each of whom held 1000 shares in
the San Fernando Mission Land Company at a
par value of $100 a share. The list included:
Henry Huntington, of course; E. H. Harriman,
president of the Union Pacific and the man to
whom Huntington had sold the Southern
Pacific after the death of his father, Collis; W.
G. Kerchoff, president of the Pacific Light and
Power Company; Joseph Satori of the Security
Trust and Savings Bank; L. C. Brand of the Title
Guarantee and Trust Company; G.K. Porter, a
San Fernando land speculator who owned the
land bought by the syndicate; and, best of all
from the Examiner’s point of view, the owners of
the three leading newspapers of the city, E. T.
Earl of the Express, and Harrison Gray Otis him-
self, publisher of the Times and “its vermiform
appendix,” the Herald.
The next morning, Otis leapt to attack the
Hearst “yellow atrocity” declaring, “The insane
desire of the Examiner to discredit certain citi-
zens of Los Angeles has at last led it into the
open as a vicious enemy of the city’s welfare.”
In subsequent days, Otis asserted that the
company had been formed two years earlier,
before the aqueduct was anything more than a
gleam in Fred Eaton’s eye, a claim which the
Examiner promptly demonstrated to be false.
According to the company charter issued
December 3, 1904, the company was formed
and its stock subscribed on November 28,
1904, after Mulholland had secured the
approval of his superiors on the water board to
go ahead with planning for the project. Also,
on November 28, Otis had issued a check for
$50,000 to secure an option on the ranch
which was the core of the syndicate’s holdings.
Full purchase of the property, however, was
not concluded until March 23, 1905, the day
after Eaton made a down payment of $100 to
secure his option on the Long Valley proper-
ty.40
With less than two weeks to go until the
city election, the high-pressure campaign for
approval of the aqueduct bond issue was
beginning to unravel. Otis’ denials of guilt did
not prevent the other newspapers of the state
from picking up the Examiner’s report on the
syndicate. Huntington rushed back to the city
and closeted himself with his advisors at the
exclusive Jonathan Club. On August 30, 1905,
the temperature fortuitously rose to 101
degrees, the highest in twenty years, and lent
credence to Mulholland’s claims of an
impending water famine, but the incipient
heat wave broke the very next day. Worst of all,
business leaders outside the circle which
stood to gain most from the construction of
the aqueduct began to comment in public that
there was no need for such haste.41 In addition,
on August 30, the Examiner observed editorial-
ly: 
Of one thing the people of
Los Angeles can be assured
and that is that they will be in
no danger of a water famine
in the future even if the pres-
ent scheme fails. No one else
will acquire the water of the
Owens Valley if the city needs
it. And, maybe, if it is other-
wise acquired there will be
less suspicion of graft in the
matter, and there will be com-
petent engineers employed to
devise a plan for impounding
the water and bringing it here.
This, however, was as close as the Examiner
would ever come to outright opposition to the
aqueduct. There were, after all, larger interests
at stake than those of Harrison Gray Otis and
his partners in the land syndicate. Henry
Huntington, for one, was then in the midst of
negotiations to create a huge new seaport at
San Pedro harbor to accommodate the traffic
expected from the new canal in Panama. In
addition, Huntington in July had initiated his
latest land boom at Redondo. John M. Elliott,
president of the Municipal League and himself
a member of the water board, had spearhead-
ed the consolidation of the First National
Bank in August, the largest merger of financial
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that time. These and other new commercial
ventures all depended for their success upon a
growing metropolis with the water to serve a
vast new population.
Accordingly, on September 2, the business
leaders of Los Angeles invited Hearst to come
to the city for private consultation. Hearst was
by now a congressman and embarked at full
sail upon his vain quest for the presidency.
Political ambition had intruded upon the qual-
ity of his journalism by 1905, causing his edi-
tors across the country to be considerably
more judicious in their exposure of graft,
deception, and public scandal than had previ-
ously been the case.42 On the morning after
Hearst’s meeting with the businessmen, the
Examiner ran a front-page editorial, reportedly
written by the Chief himself, endorsing the
aqueduct and bond issue.
Although the editorial reiterated all the
charges which the Examiner had already made
against the project, it found an excuse for its
apparent change of attitude in the recommen-
dation made September 2 by representatives
of the major business organizations in Los
Angeles that funds to be derived from the
municipal bonds not be spent until an inde-
pendent panel of engineers approved
Mulholland’s plans at some point after the
election. Considering its source, the city water
board readily agreed to this condition.
Therefore, the Examiner concluded, “The
Board’s promise not to embark deeply in the
venture until the best expert advice is
obtained, removes its most objectionable fea-
tures.”
The Examiner’s justification for its change of
position thus called upon city voters to
approve the commitment of funds for a project
which they did not understand; its dimensions,
direction, and utility would all be revealed after
they had agreed to buy this multi-million dol-
lar pig in a poke. Hearst’s decision to endorse
the project, however, was recommended by
more than mere political gamesmanship. For
all of the Examiner’s revelations of double-deal-
ing and deceit in the promotion of the bond
issue, the fact remained unalterable that the
entire community stood to benefit from the
construction of the aqueduct. If the Examiner
had sought to embarrass Otis for scooping the
Hearst paper, that objective had been
achieved. Personally, and as a matter of his
public policy in Congress and the press, Hearst
supported the principle of municipal owner-
ship of utilities. But, by silencing his Examiner,
he eliminated the last strong voice against the
bond issue, which, four days later, passed by a
margin of 14 to 1. 
This battle won, Los Angeles next turned to
the United States Congress to obtain a right of
way for the aqueduct across federal lands.
There, for the first time, they confronted the
Owens Valley interests directly in the formida-
ble presence on the House Public Lands
Committee of Sylvester C. Smith, congressman
from Inyo County. Smith proposed a compro-
mise in the form of an amendment to the right-
of-way bill introduced for the city by the
Republican senator from Los Angeles, Frank P.
Flint. By the terms of the proposed Smith com-
promise, the Reclamation Service would pro-
ceed with its irrigation project for the valley;
any excess water would be available for trans-
port to serve the domestic needs only of Los
Angeles; and any water left over after Los
Angeles’ needs were met would revert to the
Owens Valley.
Smith’s proposal, would protect the sur-
vival of the valley while at the same time allow-
ing enough water for Los Angeles to meet
those ‘needs’ which Mulholland had described
in such desperate terms during the campaign
for the bond election. But, by granting primacy
to the claims of the Owens Valley upon the
water, the Smith amendment was anathema to
the as-yet-unspoken intentions of the city
which looked ahead to the day when Los
Angeles would tap the entire flow of the Owens
River. Under the Smith amendment, as the
city’s need for water grew with her population,
she would have to fight the valley in court for
every additional drop she took from one year to
the next. Alternatively, if agriculture in the val-
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The dilemma which the Smith amendment
posed for the city as a whole was even more
extreme in the case of the interests of the San
Fernando syndicate. The success of the syndi-
cate did not depend upon immediate settle-
ment of the lands it held in the San Fernando
Valley. Instead, the syndicate looked forward to
years of profitable agricultural production
made possible by the new water to come to
these otherwise useless lands until the tide of
urbanization would eventually reach out and
claim their property. But, if use of the water for
agriculture were prohibited under the Smith
amendment, the syndicate would lose both the
promise of income in these intervening years
and, more importantly, its claims upon the
water once settlement did begin. Once again,
the private interests of Huntington, Otis, and
the rest joined with the greater public interest
served by Mulholland. As before, the need for
water as perceived by both sides was founded
in prospect rather than the existing conditions
of the Los Angeles water supply. No conspira-
cy was necessary; their objectives were the
same.
In Washington, Inyo Congressman Smith
was joined by the Secretary of the Interior
Ethan A. Hitchcock in opposition to the syndi-
cate and support of the Owens Valley ranchers.
Confronted with this alliance of authority,
Mulholland agreed to accept the Smith
amendment in a meeting with Smith and Flint
on June 21, 1906.43 Senator Flint, however, was
not so ready to concede defeat, and he turned
for assistance to President Roosevelt’s close
personal friend and chief of the Forest Service,
Gifford Pinchot. On the night of June 23, Flint
obtained an audience with Roosevelt, and,
with Pinchot’s help, he succeeded in convinc-
ing Roosevelt to oppose the Smith compro-
mise. Hitchcock did not learn of this turn of
events until June 25, when Roosevelt, despite
the secretary’s strenuous objections, sent a
formal request to the House Public Lands
Committee asking that the Smith amendment
be removed. The committee reported Flint’s
bill out the next day drawn according to TR’s
instructions, and the House promptly
approved it. On June 28, five days after Flint’s
first late night call, the bill went to the presi-
dent’s desk for signature.
Roosevelt’s decision to side with Los
Angeles and the special interests which stood
to profit from the city’s scheme to exploit the
water of a small agricultural community would
seem to mark a significant lapse in policy for a
president who is remembered today as trust-
buster, friend of the little man, and early cham-
pion of the modern conservation movement.
As Henry Pringle notes in his biography of the
president, “Roosevelt’s passionate interest in
the national forests, in reclamation of arid
western lands by irrigation, in conservation of
water power and other natural resources, may
well be considered as part of his campaign
against the malefactors of great wealth. . . . His
opposition to exploitation of water power was
based on the conception, novel in that day,
that this was the property of the people and
should redound to their benefit.”44
But, as John Morton Blum observes in The
Republican Roosevelt, TR’s policy was informed
not so much by love for the weak as by a vision
of Spencerian progression, the principles of
Social Darwinism, and an overriding desire to
establish order in a period of rapidly changing
social relationships. His objective in battling
the moneyed interests while favoring the for-
mation of labor unions and agricultural associ-
ations was not the destruction of corporate
wealth but rather the creation of “an equilibri-
um of consolidated interests over which gov-
ernment would preside.” While his vision
encompassed the details of individual cases of
hardship, his eye was fixed ultimately upon the
greater benefits for the nation which would
proceed from such a balance of competing
interests. Thus, Bluni argues, “Roosevelt spon-
sored conservation not so much to preserve a
domain for agriculture as to preserve and
enhance the strength of the whole nation.”45
In the case of the Los Angeles Aqueduct,
the locus of the national interest seemed clear
to Roosevelt. While he acknowledged that the
concerns of the Owens Valley were “genuine,”
he concluded that this interest “must unfortu-
nately be disregarded in view of the infinitely
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water in Los Angeles.” In a formal letter to
Interior Secretary Hitchcock, drafted June 25,
1906, in the secretary’s presence as “a record of
our attitude in the Los Angeles water supply
question,” Roosevelt argued, “It is a hundred or
thousand fold more important to state that
this [water] is more valuable to the people as a
whole if used by the city than if used by the
people of the Owens Valley.”46
For his part, Hitchcock focused upon the
evils of the San Fernando syndicate, warning
that the passage of Flint’s bill without the
Smith amendment would enable the city “to
use the surplus of water thus acquired beyond
the amount actually used for drinking purpos-
es for some irrigation scheme.”47 Flint respond-
ed with the conventional argument that Los
Angeles had to possess the surplus in order to
retain the city’s rights to it in the future, and he
added that Smith’s amendment was so faultily
drafted that it might prohibit use of the water
for domestic gardens in the city itself.
Roosevelt resolved the problem of the syn-
dicate’s interest after a fashion by insisting
upon an amendment to the Flint bill which
prohibited Los Angeles from selling the sur-
plus to any private interest for resale as irriga-
tion water. But, as the congressman who car-
ried Flint’s bill in the House observed, it was
clear to the Public Lands Committee that the
Roosevelt amendment “could not prevent the
Los Angeles City Council from doing what it
chose with the water. This water will belong
absolutely to Los Angeles and the city council
can do as it pleases with it—sell directly to pri-
vate individuals or corporations for irrigation
purposes, or sell to Pasadena or other sur-
rounding towns for the same purposes, or for a
water supply, or use it in any other way the
council chooses.” Smith himself agreed that,
“It did not make any difference what became of
the water after it was taken to the Los Angeles
neighborhood.”48
Roosevelt found further cause for his sup-
port of Flint’s bill in the fact that it was
opposed by “certain private power companies
whose object evidently is for their own pecu-
niary interest to prevent the municipality from
furnishing its own water.” The Southern
California Edison Company and the Los
Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation, seeing
their interests threatened by the proposed
aqueduct, had joined in the back-room lobby-
ing against the Flint legislation. This unfortu-
nate identity of interest with the power compa-
nies proved fatal for the future of the Owens
Valley, for, as Roosevelt observed of the power
companies, “Their opposition seems to me to
afford one of the strongest arguments for pass-
ing the law.”49
Although the local power companies might
have hoped to share in the general prosperity
which aqueduct water would bring to Los
Angeles, they feared more the competition
from the municipal power that the project
would generate. The dilemma posed by the
aqueduct was especially acute in the case of
the Pacific Light and Power Company, which
was owned by Henry Huntington and directed
by William G. Kerchoff. Both were members of
the San Fernando syndicate, and their interests
were consequently divided between a propri-
etary fear of public power and the private gain
they stood to make through the syndicate upon
the project’s completion. They reasoned that
their problem could be resolved if the private
power companies retained control of the
power distribution system within the city. After
the Flint bill had passed Kerchoff accordingly
approached Mulholland to discuss a long-term
lease of the power facilities on the aqueduct.
Mulholland’s view of the aqueduct as a wholly
municipal enterprise, however, did not allow
for such a compromise. He viewed Kerchoff’s
proposal in the same light as Eaton’s earlier
advocacy of private ownership of the water
itself, and he rejected Kerchoff’s overture just
as firmly.50
Mulholland’s stand on behalf of both pub-
lic power and public water left the companies
with no other option than to throw their weight
against the second municipal bond election,
scheduled for June 12, 1907, to provide the
estimated $23 million needed for actual con-
struction of the aqueduct. The campaign, how-
ever, was doomed from the outset. Every other
business institution in the city supported the
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issue on which to hang its case. The project
had already been approved by the panel of
engineers called for in the 1905 bond election.
The companies could scarcely attack Otis,
Huntington, and Kerchoff on the issue of a syn-
dicate conspiracy, and public arguments for
their own self-interests predictably carried lit-
tle weight with the electorate. From the per-
spective of the Los Angeles voters, it was one
thing for a group of special interests like the
San Fernando syndicate to profit from a project
which would yield greater benefits for all and
quite another for the special interests com-
bined in the power companies to stop the proj-
ect altogether.
The leaders of the resistance to the aque-
duct bonds of 1907 ultimately resorted to spe-
cious charges that the Owens River was pollut-
ed by unnatural concentrations of alkali. This
campaign issue, easily and promptly disproved
by chemical analysis, was promoted through
the pages of the Los Angeles Evening News, a new
paper set up under the editorship of Samual T.
Clover. In debunking the charges of “Alkali
Sammy,” Otis at the Times was scarcely moved
to the rhetorical heights he had reached in pro-
moting the initial bond election.51 Otis made
one misstep on May 24, however, when he pub-
lished a declaration that he had sold his inter-
est in the San Fernando syndicate in February,
1905, and defied the “allegators” to prove him
wrong. It was stupid for Otis to make a claim
that Clover could so easily disprove by check-
ing the public records of the syndicate’s incor-
poration, and the personal embarrassment
that resulted was unnecessary in view of the
ineffectuality of Clover’s campaign.
When Clover turned to attacking the syndi-
cate, however, Kerchoff formally withdrew from
the fight he could not truly have wished to win,
and the other power companies soon gave up,
too. Without the contributions from the power
companies which had kept his paper afloat
after the other elements of the business com-
munity withdrew their advertising, Clover went
out of business.52 By the end of May, the Times
reported, the only corporate opposition to the
bond issue came from one J. D. Hooker, owner
of a steel pipe manufacturing firm who hoped
to convince the city to use his product for con-
structing the aqueduct rather than concrete.53
On election day, the bond issue passed in
every one of the city’s 143 precincts, and the
Times wryly observed, “The antis were as rare as
a ham sandwich at a picnic of the sons of
Levi.”54
The burden of responsibility now descend-
ed upon Mulholland, the self-educated engi-
neer whose judgment and ability had been
made an issue in both the campaigns of 1905
and 1907. Opponents of the project had been
quick to point out that he had never construct-
ed a waterworks of any size and that for the six-
teen years he served as superintendent of the
Los Angeles Water Company, he had scrupu-
lously hued to the company line that there was
no need for a water project of the kind he now
proposed to build. Beginning in September,
1907, Mulholland thus began to fulfill what had
been in part a vote of confidence in himself.
The Los Angeles Aqueduct was one of the
largest municipal projects ever undertaken in
modern times. In its original form, it extended
233 miles, included 142 tunnels totaling 53
miles in length, and took six years to complete.
To service the construction work, 120 miles of
railroad track and more than 500 miles of high-
ways and trails had to be laid. Mulholland
insisted that municipal rather than private
contractors be employed wherever possible
and, toward that end, the Bureau of the Los
Angeles Aqueduct built its own cement plant,
developed a special mix of cement, and con-
structed two hydro-electric plants to provide
power to the project.55 For the construction
work itself, Mulholland devised a system of
quotas under which bonuses were paid to each
man who surpassed his quota for the day. In
this way, the work proceeded rapidly, with new
records for drilling being set and reset while
the project as a whole remained safely within
its projected budgetary limits.56
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Notes
1. Undoubtedly the most influential of the histories which
advocate a conspiracy theory for the aqueduct was Morrow
Mayo’s Los Angeles (New York, 1933) a sensationalist tract which
included a chapter on the aqueduct controversy under the title
“The Rape of the Owens Valley.” Mayo’s influence can be read
most clearly in Carey McWilliams’ treatment of the subject in
Southern California Country: An Island on the Land (New York, 1946), in
numerous articles, speeches and essays which appeared after the
destruction of the Owens Valley, and in Billion Dollar Blackjack: The
Story of Corruption and the Los Angeles Times (Beverly Hills, 1954), an
intemperate attack on Harrison Gray Otis and his successors writ-
ten by a former member of the State Board of Equalization,
William G. Bonelli, just before he fled the country to avoid indict-
ment. By 1950, as Remi Nadeau observed in his Water Seekers
(Garden City, N.Y.,1950) Mayo’s “wild charges and inaccurate his-
tory” had been “tacitly accepted as fact” (pp. 127-128). 
The film Chinatown proceeds on the assumption of a con-
spiracy. The story of the film is set in the midst of a bond election
for a new municipal water project. The project is opposed by the
city water engineer on the basis that its design would repeat the
mistakes made in the construction of an earlier project which col-
lapsed, causing considerable loss of life. The project is backed by
a powerful local industrialist who once owned the city water sup-
ply in partnership with the current city water engineer. In the
course of the film, it is discovered that the city’s water is being
secretly diverted to the sewers in order to create the illusion of a
water shortage and that the water from the new project would
benefit not the city but the semi-arid farmlands of the San
Fernando Valley, which the backers of the project have been pur-
chasing through forced sales in connivance with city officials.
Each of these elements of the plot has a basis in the history of
the aqueduct, but the sequence of events has been rearranged in
the film, characters have been compressed and simplified, inci-
dents of murder and incest have been added, and the whole has
been updated to the 1930s.
2. In “Joseph Barlow Lippincott and the Owens Valley
Controversy: Time for Revision,” Southern California Quarterly, 54
(Fall 1972), Abraham Hoffman ably reviews the historiography of
the controversy and the interdependence of the various authors
who have treated the subject. Hoffman has been searching for
correspondence relevant to the controversy for many years. In
this article he describes his difficulties in this enterprise and
presents one of his more significant finds, a letter from J. B.
Lippincott in which Lippincott attempts to justify his actions with
regard to the Owens Valley.
3. In 1887, the California legislature passed the Wright Act
which permitted fifty or more landowners to petition their County
Board of Supervisors for the formation of a public irrigation dis-
trict to be financed by the issuance of bonds and the imposition
of taxes on the landowners to be served by the district. Although
fifty public districts were formed in the three years following
enactment of the Wright Act, few succeeded, and private compa-
nies chartered by the state continued to dominate water devel-
opment through the first two decades of the twentieth century.
See Ralph J. Roske, Everyman’s Eden (New York, 1968), p. 409.
4. The Los Angeles City Council initially intended to sur-
render the city’s entire interest in its own water supply and would
have done so had not Mayor Christobal Aquilar vetoed the lease
in its original form. See Vincent Ostrom, Water and Politics: A Story
of Water Policies and Administration in the Development of Los Angeles (Los
Angeles, 1953), pp. 42-47. The rates which the company paid on
its lease were permanently set in 1868, and the company suc-
cessfully resisted subsequent attempts by the city to establish a
more equitable charge for the use of the water during the latter
decades of the lease. By the time the lease expired in 1898, the
company was declaring regular 6 percent dividends and had
earned an estimated 10-35 percent return on its investment. See
Robert M. Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles 1850-
1930 (Cambridge, Mass. 1967), p. 95.
5. Ostrom, Water and Politics, p. 46, reports on J. B.
Lippincott’s authority that under the company’s rate structure,
the average family in Los Angeles paid $5 a year for water and $10
for company profits.
6. The 1903 amendment to Article XVIII of the Los Angeles
City Charter specified that each of the five members of the board
should serve four-year staggered terms, and that no more than
three of the five should come from one political party. In addition,
the board controlled its own fund into which all of the revenues
from the water system were deposited. See Los Angeles City,
Charter as Adopted January 1889 and Amended January 1903 (Los
Angeles, 1903), pp. 58-60.
7. The city may have had little choice with regard to retain-
ing Mulholland. The Los Angeles Water Company kept few
records, and when the members of the new city water board
asked to see a map of the distribution system they had acquired,
Mulholland replied that there was no map but that he could tell
them anything they wanted to know. According to this story,
which may have improved in the retelling, Mulholland was able
to recall from memory the age, diameter, and length of every sec-
tion of pipe in the company’s 325-mile system, and he was the
only source the city had for such information. See J. B. Lippincott,
“William Mulholland—Engineer, Pioneer, Raconteur” Part II, Civil
Engineering, II:161-64 (March, 1941).
8. First settled in the early 1860s by prospectors and
stockmen, the Owens Valley had no sooner overcome the resi-
dent Indians than hard times descended on the region. In the
1870s, the area became a refuge for bandits, and as late as 1875,
the outlaw Tiburcio Vasques commanded the highways of south-
ern Inyo. Although mail service and a telegraph line were estab-
lished in 1875 and 1876 respectively, the Owens Valley did not
truly begin to share in the prosperity of the more settled regions
of Nevada and California until the turn of the century. See Willie
Arthur Chalfant, The Story of Inyo (Published by the Author, Second
Revised Edition, 1933). Hereinafter, Chalfant, 2nd.
9. Sacramento Union, March 30, 1927.
10. The initial surveys by the Reclamation Service were
made in June, 1903. In July, 21,000 acres of Owens Valley land
were removed from entry; in August, an additional 436,480 acres;
in October, 58,000 acres; and in January, 1904, a final 50,000 acres,
for a total of 564,480 acres. Chalfant, 2nd, p. 339.
11. Lippincott’s apologium to a family friend, Fernand
Lungren, is dated September 19, 1905, and is reprinted in full in
Hoffman, “Lippincott and Owens Valley Controversy,” fn. 2.
Lippincott commented, “If I have done any wrong in connection
with this matter, it was in the writing of this report [on Southern
California water, for which he was paid by Los Angeles.]”
Lippincott explained, “I wrote this report because I considered it
a public duty, because I wanted to help the City that I lived in for
fifteen years, and because I believe it is the real purpose of these
records that they should be used in aiding the best development
of the country at large.”
12. Los Angeles Times, August 5, 1905. A Miner’s inch, a unit
of measurement employed by Southern California hydrographers
of this period, was equivalent to .02 of a cubic foot per second
flow. Over the course of a year, this proposed $1.5 million sale
would have yielded approximately 217,138 acre feet of water to
Los Angeles.
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14. Quotation attributed to Lippincott by Nadeau, Water
Seekers, 25.
15. Eaton discusses his plans for a cattle empire in the Los
Angeles Examiner, July 30, 1905. In addition to the cattle, which
were his to keep regardless of whether the aqueduct were
approved, Eaton received $10 a day plus expenses for his efforts
in securing options on behalf of Los Angeles. Chalfant, 2nd, p.
343, reports that it was understood at the time that Eaton only
invested $30,000 of his own money to secure the option on Long
Valley.
16. Lippincott, in his letter to Lungren (see footnotes 2
and 11) denies supplying Eaton with credentials and comments,
“The allegation that these options were entered into under the
assumption that they were given for the Reclamation Service may
or may not be true, but certainly the Reclamation Service or
myself have never in any manner, directly or indirectly, given
these people to understand that this was the case. It was a con-
clusion which they jumped at themselves.” Lippincott does admit
sending Eaton a letter, but declares that it simply asked Eaton to
report on his progress. Lippincott could not produce a copy of
this letter at the time he wrote to Lungren, and Chalfant, 2nd, p.
342, states that the letter Eaton produced established him as
Lippincott’s agent in examining right of way applications for a
federal power project in the valley. If Lippincott did not provide
Eaton with the credentials of a federal agent, he was certainly
aware of what Eaton was doing because Lippincott told Lungren
he had to tell Eaton to stop representing himself as a federal
agent “on more than one occasion.”
17. Arthur P. Davis to F. H. Newell, undated correspon-
dence, quoted in Chalfant, 2nd, p. 343. Davis’ concern was
prompted by an investigation of the service’s action on the
Owens Valley project by Acting Secretary of the Interior Thomas
Ryan. Ryan, in turn, was acting on complaints concerning Eaton’s
activities which had been made to the Department of Interior and
to the president by the registrar of the land office in
Independence.
18. Lippincott to Lungren in Hoffman, “Lippincott and
Valley Controversy.”
19. Clausen estimated the total cost of the Reclamation
Service project for the Owens Valley at $2,293,398. This included
a reservoir and 140-foot dam at Long Valley and irrigation canals
skirting the Sierra and White Mountain ranges on the west sides
of the valley. Chalfant, 2nd, pp. 340-341.
20. Nadeau, Water Seekers, p. 28.
21. Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1905.
22. Ibid.
23. The Newell resolution was not recorded, but portions
of it are quoted in Chalfant 2nd, p. 345, and in the San Francisco
Call, April 28, 1924. Chalfant reports (p. 348) that the Reclamation
Service spent $26,000 on its plans for the valley, for which it was
reimbursed $14,000 by the city. Also, in the first edition of The
Story of Inyo, published in 1922 (hereinafter Chalfant 1st), he
states that Lippincott and an aide received $1,000 from the city in
direct payments (p. 324).
24. Remi Nadeau, Los Angeles (New York, 1960), p. 69. See
also Roske, Everyman’s Eden, 415.
25. The Examiner was the only agency to provide the citi-
zens of Los Angeles with a detailed map of the Owens Valley
itself, which the paper’s staff pieced together from topographic
studies and published on August 20, 1905.
26. See, for example, Los Angeles Examiner, August 16, 18,
1905.
27. See, for example, Los Angeles Examiner, August 17, 28,
1905.
28. Erwin Cooper, Aqueduct Empire (Glendale, 1968), p. 60.
Cooper uses 1895 as the starting date for the drought; Roske and
Nadeau use 1892. Mulholland used both without partiality.
29. United States, Department of Agriculture, Weather
Bureau, Climactic Summary of the United States (Washington, D.C.,
1930), section 18, Southern California and Owens Valley, pp. 3-5,
17, 18.
30. Nadeau, Water Seekers, 20-21.
31. Rainfall in August, 1904, totalled 0.17 inches as com-
pared with the average rainfall for August in the period 1891-1930
of 0.03 inches; the next greatest August rainfall in this four-year
period occurred in 1901, 0.09 inches. There was no August rainfall
at all in thirty-one of the forty years included in this survey.
32. Calculations for the period 1958-1973 and 1950-1973
are made from the precipitation tables which appear in the
California Statistical Abstract in the volumes for 1971-1974 and the
comprehensive edition of 1970. Precipitation data is prepared by
the California Department of Water Resources in cooperation
with the United States Department of Commerce, Environmental
Science Services Administration.
33. Mulholland’s calculations were based on a total water
supply estimated at 33-34 million gallons per day at a peak con-
sumption rate of 190 gallons per capita. See Los Angeles Examiner,
July 31, 1905. Nadeau, Water Seekers, p. 34, notes that critics of the
project later charged that Mulholland diverted water from the city
reservoirs into the sewers in order to create the illusion of a water
famine. No such allegation ever reached print during the cam-
paign of 1905, although the Examiner, on September 1, 1905, car-
ried a story in conjunction with Mulholland’s claim of drought
which noted that the city was losing 24,000 gallons a day from
leaks in the municipal high service reservoirs.
34. Los Angeles Examiner, August 2, 1905.
35. Los Angeles Examiner, July 30, 1905.
36. Los Angeles Examiner, August 15, 1905.
37. Los Angeles Examiner, August 16, 1905.
40. See Los Angeles Examiner, August 24, 25, 28, 1905.
41. See, for example, the comments printed in the
Examiner, September 2, 1905, by H. W. Hellman, president of the
Merchants National Bank, and C. Seligman of the M. A. Newark
and Company calling for the creation of a “committee of large tax-
payers” to investigate the project.
42. Swanberg describes the situation of the Hearst chain
in the summer of 1905 as follows: “Every Hearstman from Boston
to Los Angeles knew how the Chief had been bitten by the
Presidential bug, and it subtracted something from their already
limited integrity in reporting the news. Most of all, it affected the
Chief himself. Before politics seized him he had taken a fierce
pride in his journalistic achievements, outlandish though they
often were. Now, Politician Hearst subtracted something from
Editor Hearst. While it would not be quite fair to say that he now
considered his newspapers simply as a means to reach the White
House, that would be an important part of their function.” W. A.
Swanberg, Citizen Hearst (New York, 1961), pp. 221-222.
43. Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1906.
44. Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1931),
Harvest Books Edition, p. 302.
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46. Roosevelt’s letter to Hitchcock is reprinted in full in
the Los Angeles Times, June 28, 1906.
47. Ibid.
48. Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1906.
49. Roosevelt to Hitchcock, Los Angeles Times, June 28, 1906.
50. In 1911, the local power companies attempted to pro-
mote this same proposal once again in the form of an unsuc-
cessful charter amendment which would have allowed the com-
panies to buy power from the aqueduct and market it within the
city, thereby saving Los Angeles the cost of building its own dis-
tribution system (See Fogelson, Fragmented Metropolis, 230-233).
Mulholland, by this time, was safely removed from any position
which would bring him into direct confrontation with the private
power interests. In 1907, he retained E. F. Scattergood as the
aqueduct electrical engineer. On Mulholland’s recommendation,
Scattergood was subsequently placed at the head of a separate
bureau exclusively responsible for the distribution of aqueduct
power. This division of responsibilities made practical sense
because Mulholland had no expertise in the field of power gen-
eration. But it also proved politically fortunate for Mulholland,
whose water programs were generally popular, while Scattergood
met with intense opposition from certain segments of the busi-
ness community and became the focus of controversy for many
years. Ostrom, Water and Politics, pp. 83-84, describes this political
division as follows: “Mulholland and the water bureau usually
had the political support of the more conservative commercial
and business organizations of the community. The Chamber of
Commerce always supported a water bond and the Los Angeles
Times always gave Mulholland a favorable press. . . . On the other
hand, the power bureau was consistently opposed by a substan-
tial group of the business community identified with the private
utility companies. . . . Beginning in 1914, the Los Angeles Times
opposed power bond issues as consistently as it supported water
bond issues.”
51. See for example, Los Angeles Times, May 20, 21, and 24,
1907.
52. Los Angeles Herald, June 4, 1907.
53. Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1907.
54. Los Angeles Times, June 13, 1907. The election was novel
in that it marked an early appearance of the automobile in the
strategy of modern campaigning. For the first time, the wealthier
members of the community donated their new horseless car-
riages to ferry voters to and from the polls. The resulting turnout
was the largest yet recorded for a special election in Los Angeles:
24,051 as compared with only 11,542 ballots cast in the first bond
election two years earlier.
55. Mulholland enjoyed an estimated 20 per cent savings
on construction costs by relying on municipal employees rather
than private contractors. The Bureau of the Los Angeles
Aqueduct itself built all but eleven miles of the canal and drilled
all but 1485 feet of tunnel. See Ostrom, Water and Politics, 94.
56. In his haste to get construction under way, however,
Mulholland failed to secure his financing. Instead of waiting to
accumulate funds from the bond sales, Mulholland arranged for
advanced sales of the aqueduct securities to New York City bond
merchants. As a result, he operated with a cash reserve sufficient
to cover only thirty days of continued construction. In May, 1910,
the bond market collapsed, and Mulholland was forced to lay off
more than 70 percent of his work force. These massive layoffs, in
turn, brought increases in the unit prices charged for food by
Mulholland’s concessionaires on the project. The resulting dis-
satisfaction among the work crews provided a long-awaited open-
ing for the radical Industrial Workers of the World which began
organizing the laborers on the aqueduct through the Western
Federation of Miners. By November, Mulholland faced a strike
along the entire length of the project, and order was restored only
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